Using an iterated Horner schema for evaluation of diophantine polynomials, we define a partial µ-recursive "decision" algorithm decis as a "race" for a first nullstelle versus a first (internal) proof of non-nullity for such a polynomial -within a given theory T extending Peano Arithmétique PA. If T is diophantine sound, i. e. if (internal) provability implies truth -for diophantine formulae -, then the T-map decis gives correct results when applied to the codes of polynomial inequalities D(x 1 , . . . , x m ) = 0. The additional hypothesis that T be diophantine complete (in the syntactical sense) would guarantee in addition termination of decis on these formula, i. e. decis would constitute a decision algorithm for diophantine formulae in the sense of Hilbert's 10th problem. From Matiyasevich's impossibility for such a decision it follows, that a consistent theory T extending PA cannot be both diophantine sound and diophantine complete. We infer from this the existence of a diophantine formulae which is undecidable by T. Diophantine correctness is inherited by the diophantine completion T of T, and within this extension decis terminates on all externally given diophantine polynomials, correctly. Matiyasevich's theoremfor the strengthening T of T -then shows that T, and hence T, cannot be diophantine sound. But since the internal consistency formula Con T for T implies -within PA -diophantine soundness of T, we get PA ⊢ ¬Con T , in particular PA must derive its own internal inconsistency formula.
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Overview
(i) Consider a theory T with quantifiers and having terms for all primitive recursive maps ("p. r. maps"); so T is to be Peano Arithmétique PA or one of PA's extensions, e.g. ZF or NGB.
(ii) Obtain the theory T by adding to T the axiom ¬Con T of internal inconsistency. By Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, T is consistent relative to T.
(iii) T admits a µ-recursive, partially defined "algorithm" decis aimed at deciding T-internal (Gödel numbers of) p. r. predicates.
(iv) By internal semantical completeness of T with respect to p. r. predicates -involving evaluation of (Gödel numbers of) internal p. r. predicates -it is shown that in T the partial µ-recursive T-map decis is in fact total, and that it gives correct resultsthe latter for arguments p of form p = ϕ , ϕ = ϕ(n) a p. r. predicate, ϕ ∈ N its internal Gödel number.
(v) within T, decis decides in particular (systems of) diophantine equations.
(vi) Matiyasevich's negative result concerning this decision problem of Hilbert is a theorem of T, a fortiori of T.
(vii) This contradiction shows T, hence also T, to be inconsistent: "unbounded formal quantification is incompatible with infinity."
Decision
Crucial for the present approach to Hilbert's decision problem is availability -within T -of a (µ-recursive) evaluation map ev : N×N ⊃ |N, 2| PR × N → 2 on the T-internal (primitive recursively decidable) set |N, 2| PR ⊂ N of Gödel numbers ("codes") of p. r. predicates.
(Primitive recursive predicates are viewed as p. r. map terms with codomain 2 ⊂ N). This evaluation map ev is defined in T by (nested) double recursionà la Ackermann, see Péter 1967 , and satisfies the characteristic equation
Define now the partial µ-recursive "decision" T-map
hoped for deciding (internal) p. r. predicates p, i. e. p ∈ |N, 2| PR ⊂ formulae T = formulae T ⊂ N, via the two "antagonistic" termination indices
here the p. r. enumeration thm
N is the T-internal version of the metamathematical enumeration of all (Gödel numbers of) T-theorems; enumeration is lexicographic by "length of shortest proof". Finally, we define the -a priori partial -µ-recursive T-map
For proving decis to be totally defined within T = T + ¬Con T we rely on the following Lemma (Internal Semantical Completeness):
with p free on |N, 2| PR , in closed form:
Proof: One of the equivalent T-formulae expressing internal inconsistency of T is
"every internal formula (its Gödel number in T) is provable" (emphasis from Gödel). This gives in particular
p free on |N, 2| PR ⊂ formulae T ⊂ N, and hence -trivially -the assertion of the Lemma.
Decision Lemma:
is in fact totally defined, with other words it terminates on all internal Gödel numbers p ∈ |N, 2| PR .
(
Proof of (i):
by internal semantical completeness of T above
Hence not both of µ ex (p), µ thm (p) can be undefined. This shows termination decis(p) ∈ {0, 1} of decis within T for all (internal) p. r. predicates p (Gödel numbers thereof). Proof of (ii):
Hilbert's 10th Problem revisited
A system D :
of k diophantine equations -see Matiyasevich 1993, 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 -gives rise to a p. r. predicate
having the property that (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ N m is a solution to system (D) iff it is a counterexample to ϕ, and (D) has no solution (in natural numbers) iff ϕ holds for (
. . , x m ) ∈ N is a counterexample to ψ, and (D) is unsolvable iff ψ(n) holds for n free in N. So from the Decision Lemma (for p.r. predicates) above we obtain: Decision Theorem:
(i) Within the -somewhat strange -theory T = T + ¬Con T , the (partial) µ-recursive map (the "algorithm") decis : |N, 2| PR ⇀ 2 decides all (internal) primitive recursive predicates, in particular all (internal, a fortiori external) Gödel numbers coding "diophantine" predicates as considered above, and hence decides internal, a fortiori external (systems of) Diophantine equations.
(ii) Since µ-recursion and Turing-machines have equal computation power -by the verified part of Church's thesis -this means: Within T, decis gives rise to a Turing machine T M deciding all internally given as well as all externally given Diophantine equations, i. e. T admits a positive solution to Hilbert's 10th problem.
(iii) On the other hand, Matiyasevich's negative solution to this problem needs as a formal framework T just Arithmétique +∃.
(iv) The latter two results -Matiyasevich's negative T-theorem and our positive T-theorem contradict each other in the stronger theory T. This shows T to be inconsistent.
(v) Gödel's consistency of ¬Con T relative to T then entails inconsistency of T, whence in particular inconsistency of Peano Arithmétique PA and of the classical set theories.
Corollary: Since Matiyasevich 1993 makes essential use of formal (existential) quantification for "unsolving" Hilbert's 10th problem, this only decision problem on Hilbert's list is again open -for treatment within the framework of a suitable constructive foundation for Arithmetic.
Appendix: Evaluation
In section 2 we made appeal to availability in T of an evaluation ev = ev (p, n) of (internal) p. r. predicate codes p satisfying ev ( ϕ , n) = ϕ(n) for ("external") p. r. predicates ϕ : N → 2 in T. We identify a p. r. predicate ϕ = ϕ(n) of T with its associated p. r. map term ϕ = ϕ(n) : N → 2, since we want to define the evaluation of (internal) p. r. predicates by restriction of an evaluation of all internal p. r. map terms out of the set |N, 2| PR ⊂ N of (internal) p. r. map terms from N to 2.
For defining this map term evaluation ev by (nested) double recursionà la Ackermann (cf. Péter 1967) we need a universal set
of all nested pairs of natural numbers, and hence containing all PRobjects 1, N, . . . , A, . . . , B, A × B, . . . as disjoint (exception: 1 ⊂ N) p. r. decidable subsets. This set N ( * ) is directly available in set theory. Within Peano Arithmétique, it can be "constructed" via coding as a decidable subset of N.
of the internal (Gödel numbers of) p. r. maps u, v, w ∈ PR ⊂ N, on binary nested tupels a, b, c ∈ N ( * ) of natural numbers is now defined by (nested) double recursion with principal recursion parameter "operator-depth" depth(u) of u as follows:
This defines ev on PR's (map-)constants, depth of these "basic" map terms is set to 1. We now define ev on compound internal p. r. map terms:
This definition is legitimate, since
Example:
"evaluation in the second component". legitimacy of this definition:
This last case is in fact a (nested) double recursionà la Ackermann, since the internally iterated u § of u is evaluated in a p. r. manner with respect to the second parameter n ∈ N -which is to count the iteration loops still to be performed. The principal recursion parameter is (internal) operator-depth depth = depth (u) : N ⊃ PR → N, in particular in this last case depth(u § ) = def depth(u) + 1.
Each primitive recursive map can be generated from the basic maps 0, s, id, !, ∆, Θ, and ℓ by composition, cylindrification and iteration: substitution is realized via composition with the induced (f, g) = (f, g)(c) = (f (c), g(c)) which in turn is obtained via diagonal, cylindrification, transposition, and composition. Since iteration g § then gives the ("full") schema of primitive recursion (see Freyd 1972 , Pfender et al. 1994 , ev in fact evaluates all Gödel numbers of (internal) p. r. map terms, recursively given in the above way.
Let us call PR + ev the extension of PR by a (formal) map
satisfying the above 2-recursive system for ev . For our "set" theory T we now prove the following Evaluation Lemma: For primitive recursive f :
in particular for ϕ : N → 2 (the map term representing) a p. r. predicate of T :
Proof by external ("metamathematical") induction on the operatordepth depth(f ) ∈ N of f varying on PR ⊂ N , in case of an iterated f = g § (a, n) : A × N → A this external induction will be combined with an internal induction on the iteration parameter n ∈ N. depth : PR → N is the external primitive recursive "twin" of depth : PR → N above; it is characterised by depth( f ) = num(depth(f )) for f : A → B in PR ⊂ T. Here num = num(n) : N → T(1, N) maps each external natural number n into its corresponding T-numeral, as defined e.g. in set theory by associating von Neumann numerals.
-Anchoring: the assertion holds for the basic maps 0, . . . , ℓ (with depth set to 1 ∈ N ) just by definition of ev . ( g , a) ) by definition of ev = ev ( h , g(a)) by recursion hypothesis on g since depth(g) < depth(f ) = h(g(a)) by recursion hypothesis on h since depth(h) < depth(f ) ev ( g , b) ) by definition of ev = (a, g(b)) by recursion hypothesis on g since depth(g) < depth(f ) = (id × g)(a, b) = f (a, b).
-The remaining case -not quite so simple -is that of an iterated f = g § : A × N → A of a (p. r.) endo map g : A → A, g § characterized by g § (a, 0) = a, g § (a, n + 1) = g(g § (a, n)) : the assertion of the Lemma holds in this last case too, since -"anchoring" n = 0 for internal induction:
ev ( f , (a, 0)) = ev ( g § , (a, 0)) = ev ( g § , (a, 0)) = a since § internalizes ( )= g § (a, 0) = f (a, 0)
-as well as (internal induction step, using the external recursion hypothesis):
ev ( f , (a, n + 1)) = ev ( g § , (a, n + 1)) = ev ( g § , (a, n + 1)) since § internalizes ( )= ev ( g , ev ( g § , (a, n)))
by (internal) inductive definition of ev in the present case v = u § = g § = ev ( g , ev ( g § , (a, n))) by § internalizing ( )= ev ( g , g § (a, n)) by (internal) induction hypothesis on n = g(g § (a, n)) by (external) recursion hypothesis on g since depth(g) < depth(f )) = g § (a, n + 1) = f (a, n + 1) by definition of the iterated g § q.e.d.
